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DOE V. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AND
CAMPUS BANS ON "RACIST SPEECH": THE
VIEW FROM WITHIN
ROBERT

I.

A.

SEDLERt

INTRODUCTION

In reading the numerous law review articles advocating some
form of restriction for "racist speech"' on campus, 2 I am struck
by the difference between how campus bans on "racist speech"
are analyzed by academic commentators and by lawyers and judges
in the context of actual litigation. Academic commentators typically
justify restricting "racist speech" on the ground that it is inconsistent with the equality value of the fourteenth amendment. They
contend that the freedom of expression interest implicated by the
restriction must be balanced against the state's prerogative-and
even obligation-to advance the equality value of the fourteenth
amendment by restricting "racist speech." Not surprisingly, they

t Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956; J.D., 1959,
University of Pittsburgh.
1. "Racist speech" is a generic term, referring to speech that denigrates
persons on the basis of their race, gender, sexual orientation or the like. The
commentators contend that "racist speech" causes demonstrable harm to racial
minorities, women, gay and lesbian persons, and other "victim groups," because
it brands them as inferior to the dominant societal group of heterosexual white
males. "Racist speech" is also said to promote the ideology of dominant group
supremacy and is a "mechanism for keeping selected victim groups in subordinated positions." Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. Ruv. 2320, 2332-36 (1989).
2. These articles include Brownstein, Regulating Hate Speech at Public
Universities: Are FirstAmendment Values FunctionallyIncompatible with Equal
Protection Principles?, 39 BtrAo L. REv. 1 (1991); Lawrence, If He Hollers
Let Him Go: RegulatingRacist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Smolla,
Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 171 (1990); and Matsuda, supra note 1. The constitutional
and policy arguments against campus bans on "racist speech" are set forth in
Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus:A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DuKE
L.J. 484 (1990). This author's constitutional analysis of campus bans on "racist
speech" is set forth in Sedler, "Racist Speech" on Campus and the First
Amendment: The View from Without and Within (forthcoming) [hereinafter
Racist Speech].
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conclude that because "racist speech" is "low value" speech, and
because it causes demonstrable harm to racial minorities and other
"victim groups," the state's interest in advancing the equality
value outweighs the freedom of expression interest and justifies
'3
restricting "racist speech."
My own views concerning the constitutional permissibility of
campus bans on "racist speech" are "lawyers' views," ' 4 and have
been formed primarily in the context of my role as lead counsel
for the plaintiff in the successful challenge to the campus "racist
speech" policy in Doe v. University of Michigan.5 As I have

explained more fully elsewhere, 6 in actual litigation the analytical

framework for the resolution of first amendment issues is what I
have called the "law of the first amendment." The "law of the
first amendment" is that body of concepts, principles, specific
guidelines and the "balancing/subsidiary doctrine ' 7 that has

emerged from Supreme Court decisions in first amendment cases
over the years. It is the "law of the first amendment" that governs

actual first amendment cases that come before the courts for
decision.
3. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 2, at 438-49, 466-72; Matsuda, supra
note 1, at 2374-80.
4. As an academic commentator who regularly engages in constitutional
litigation, I have both "academic commentators' views" and "lawyers' views"
on a number of constitutional questions. My "academic commentators' views"
refer to my view of what the Constitution should mean, while my "lawyers'
views" refer to my understanding of what the Constitution does mean in the
context of actual litigation. Sometimes I am successful in persuading a court to
accept my "academic commentators' views." See Sedler, The Constitution and
the Consequences of the Social History of Racism, 40 ARK. L. REv. 677, 73138 (1987) (governmental action having a "racially discriminatory effect" should
be unconstitutional unless supported by strong justification), and NAACP v.
City of Dearborn, 173 Mich. App. 602, 434 N.W.2d 444 (1988), leave to appeal
denied, 433 Mich. 904, 447 N.W.2d 751 (1989) (the "anti-discrimination" clause
of the Michigan Constitution, Art. I, § 2, reaches governmental action having a
"racially discriminatory effect"). In regard to the constitutional protection of
"racist speech," there is complete congruence between my "academic commentators' views" and my "lawyers' views."
5. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
6. Sedler, The First Amendment in Litigation: The "Law of the First
Amendment," 48 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Law of the First
Amendment].
7. The term, "balancing/subsidiary doctrine," refers to the "subsidiary
doctrine" that is found in the precedents dealing with a particular kind of
restriction or interference with expression. This precedent has resulted from the
residual application of the "balancing approach" in cases where the result is not
controlled by an applicable concept, principle or specific doctrine. Id. at 5-6.
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Doe v. University of Michigan is the seminal case presenting

a first amendment challenge to a public university's ban on "racist
speech." The district court, invoking the important first amendment principles of content neutrality, protection of offensive speech,

and heightened protection for expression in the academic context,
held that under the void on its face doctrine, the university's
"racist speech" policy violated the first amendment. Doe is still
the only reported case dealing with this highly controversial matter,
and because there was no appeal from the district court's decision,

it is likely to serve as a starting point for the constitutional analysis
of "racist speech" policies adopted by other public universities.'

Academic commentators who favor restrictions on "racist
speech" tend to discount the Doe decision. Some commentators
focus on the fact that the doctrinal basis of the district court's
decision in Doe was the impermissible overbreadth and vagueness

of the university's "racist speech" policy. They see the decision
as doing no more than invalidating one university's imprecisely

drafted policy. 9 Other commentators fault the district court for
failing to give sufficient weight to the "equality" value in its

constitutional analysis, although they do not contend that the
decision itself was erroneous. 10 It is clear that Doe is not viewed
by these commentators as a very important decision that will cast
serious doubts on the constitutional permissibility of virtually any
"racist speech" restriction on campus. They give only passing

mention to Doe and go about the business of advocating significant
campus bans on "racist speech."'"
8. It has also had an impact on proposals to adopt "racist speech" policies
at other public universities. See the discussion in Strossen, supra note 2, at 507
n.115.
9. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 2, at 477-78 nn.161-62 ("poorly drafted
and obviously overbroad regulation"); Smolla, supra note 2, at 208 ("failed to
confine sufficiently its definition of covered speech").
10. See, e.g., Jones, Equality, Dignity and Harm: The Constitutionalityof
Regulating American Campus Ethnoviolence, 37 WAYNE L. Rv. 1383 (1991);
Brownstein, supra note 2, at n.84.
11. However, the Doe decision may have had at least a subliminal effect
on these commentators, to the extent that they all say that they are advocating
only limited and narrowly-framed bans on racist speech. They implicitly concede
that the first amendment does not permit a public university to ban the expression
of "racist ideas," and they deny that this is the purpose of the proposed bans.
Of course, they do not deny that the proposed bans may have this effect. Their
focus is almost entirely on the harm that is caused to "victim groups" by "racist
speech" on a university campus. What they seem to be saying is that even if the
proposed bans do have the effect of restricting the expression of "racist ideas"
in some circumstances, they are necessary to prevent the harm to "victim groups."
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Perhaps not surprisingly, I view the impact of Doe quite
differently. I assert that Doe is a very important case, and that
in the real world of constitutional litigation, it will be a "landmark" decision having considerable impact on the constitutional
permissibility of campus bans on "racist speech." To understand
why this will be so, it is necessary to understand precisely why
the district court in Doe held the University of Michigan's "racist
speech" policy unconstitutional. While the district court invalidated the policy on the basis of its impermissible overbreadth
and vagueness, the Doe decision was not about poorly drafted
campus bans on "racist speech." The University of Michigan's
policy was not one that had been carelessly drafted or that used
language that inadvertently reached some protected expression.
Quite to the contrary, the policy went through a large number
of drafts, and the language of the policy was deliberately chosen
to accomplish a specific objective. It was the objective itself and
the underlyingpremises on which it was based that rendered the
policy unconstitutional.
The primary objective of the University of Michigan's "racist
speech" policy was to prohibit the expression of "racist ideas."
The justification for the prohibition was that the expression of
"racist ideas" created an "intimidating, hostile and demeaning
environment" on the campus for minority students and other
members of "victim groups." However, as will be discussed
more fully subsequently, a prohibition on the expression of
"racist ideas" is inconsistent with the important first amendment
principles of content neutrality, the protection of offensive speech,
and heightened protection of expression in the academic context.
Therefore, a public university cannot constitutionally prohibit
the expression of "racist ideas" on campus. Because the language
of the University of Michigan's policy was deliberately chosen
to accomplish this specific objective, the policy was, on its face,
violative of the first amendment.
The reasons why the University of Michigan's policy violated
the first amendment indicate that virtually every ban of "racist
speech" on campus imposed by a public university will also be
held unconstitutional. Campus bans on "racist speech," no
matter how narrowly-framed and no matter how justified, are
directed primarily against the expression of "racist ideas." Under
the "law of the first amendment," a public university cannot
constitutionally prohibit the expression of "racist ideas" on
campus.
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THE CONTROVERSY OVER "RACIST SPEECH" ON CAMPUS AND THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN'S "RACIST SPEECH" POLICY

The reasons given by universities for restricting "racist speech"
on campus may be assumed to reflect a genuine concern for the
personal and educational welfare of racial minorities, women, gay
and lesbian persons and other "victim groups."12 These reasons,
however, interact with another phenomenon that goes beyond the
personal and educational welfare of the students who are assumed
to have suffered harm from the effects of "racist speech." This
phenomenon is the emergence of a new secular orthodoxy on the
campuses of many universities today. This secular orthodoxy 3
involves the implementation of values that came to the forefront
in the 1960s, and include racial equality, gender equality, respect
for individual differences and alternative lifestyles. These values
are widely held by many in the university community-and by no
one more strongly than this author-however, the efforts to implement these values in the university context all too often give
rise to an officially-imposed secular orthodoxy, in which ideas that
are seemingly inconsistent with these values are deemed "illegitimate."'14

12. See supra note 1.
13. Popularly referred to as "politically correct thinking" or "P.C."
14. One such idea, for example, is that there are biological differences
among racial groups which contribute to cognitive and other differences among
the races. A related idea is that biological differences between men and women
cause them to behave differently in some respects, so that men are biologically
more suited to perform certain kinds of tasks while women are biologically more
suited to perform other kinds of tasks, such as taking care of children. Other
aspects of this secular orthodoxy are that homosexuality is morally acceptable
and a legitimate lifestyle, that the tenets of feminism are superior to the traditional
view of women, and that "male-oriented" sexuality is a form of discrimination
against women.
It is interesting to note that many university faculty members and administrators today are products of the '60s. They are trying to implement on campus
values to which they are strongly committed, values that came to the forefront
in the '60s. In the '50s and '60s, the universities all too often tried to establish
a political orthodoxy by restricting the expression of controversial political ideas
and prohibiting "anti-establishment" political activity. As will be seen subsequently, the first amendment principle of heightened protection of expression in
the academic context, which emerged from the constitutional challenges to the
efforts of public universities to impose a political orthodoxy in the '50s and '60s,
now operates to prevent public universities from imposing a secular orthodoxy
on campus today.
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Moreover, public universities have many constitutionally permissible means at their disposal to protect the personal and educational welfare of minority students and other "victim groups."
These include, first and foremost, the prohibition of discrimination
and the vigorous enforcement of the university's antidiscrimination
policy.' 5 They also include the protection of individual students
from harmful acts specifically directed against them by other
students; for example, the intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual harassment in the form of unwanted sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, nonconsensual physical touching, and
the sending of "obscene phone calls" to another student. In regard
to minority students, the university can best promote equality of
educational opportunity by making a strong commitment to "affirmative action," thereby enrolling a "critical mass" of minority
students, and by hiring a reasonable number of minority faculty
and administrators. Finally, universities can expand their curricula
to promote the values of equality and to provide increased knowledge about racism, sexism, homophobia and the like in American
society.
Since public universities have all these means at their disposal
to advance equality of educational opportunity for minority students and other "victim groups," the claimed necessity for bans
on "racist speech" on campus is a dubious assertion. This is
especially true for those public universities whose enthusiasm for
the more "costly" means of achieving equality of educational
opportunity-such as a strong commitment to "affirmative action"-has been less than striking. Bans on "racist speech" may
also have as their objective the imposition of a new secular
orthodoxy that conforms with the beliefs of many faculty members
and administrators today. Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that
universities have many more effective means of achieving equal
educational opportunity than bans on "racist speech." Unlike bans
on "racist speech," the use of such means does not risk undercutting the freedom of unfettered inquiry to which a university

15. The university can prohibit discrimination on the part of faculty members, such as applying differential grading standards to minority or women
students, or refusing to call on them in class, or belittling them when they do
speak. It can prohibit discrimination by university-recognized student organizations, such as where a fraternity has racial or religious restrictions on membership.
The university can further prohibit recruiting on campus by employers that engage

in discrimination against "victim groups," such as a ban on military recruitment
because of the military's discrimination against gay and lesbian persons.
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should be committed. Additionally, these means do not give rise
to serious constitutional problems for public universities.
The substance of the University of Michigan's "racist speech"
policy, and how it operated in practice will be discussed in detail
elsewhere.1 6 Therefore, only a brief summary of that discussion
suffices here. The policy went through a number of drafts, with
its objective reflected in the language of the policy as well as in
the "legislative history" leading up to its promulgation. The rationale for the policy, stated by then acting President Fleming in
a confidential memorandum to the University's executive officers
on December 14, 1987, was that "students at a university cannot
by speaking or writing discriminatory remarks which seriously
offend many individuals beyond the immediate victim, and which,
therefore detract from the necessary educational climate of a
'7
campus, claim immunity from a campus disciplinary proceeding.'
This rationale was embodied in the language of the policy. The
policy applied to "educational and academic centers, such as
classroom buildings, libraries, research laboratories, recreation and
study centers.""' In those areas, students were subject to discipline
for "verbal behavior" that (1) "stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of race.

.

." and (2) "[c]reates an intimidating,

hostile, or demeaning environment for educational pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored... activities.' 9
The district court held that the italicized language rendered the
policy unconstitutionally vague. 20 Moreover, this language clearly
indicates that the policy was directed against the expression of
"racist ideas;" ideas considered offensive to racial minorities and
other "victim groups."'

16. See Racist Speech, supra note 2.
17. 721 F. Supp. at 855.
18. Id. at 856.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 867. The court also found impermissible vagueness in the "threats"
and "effects" provisions.
21. The use of the phrase, "intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment
for educational pursuits," in the University of Michigan's "racist speech" policy
and the "racist speech" policies of many other universities is an unfortunate
example of the "fallacy of the transplanted concept." The concept of "hostile
environment" finds its source in EEOC Guidelines which define prohibited onthe-job sexual harassment. These Guidelines define prohibited sexual harassment
to include both "quid pro quo" sexual demands and "unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature where such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
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The assertion that the policy was directed against the expression
of "racist ideas" is further indicated by the examples of violations
set forth in an authoritative "interpretive guide" issued by the
University. 22 It was our contention that "[e]very single example

with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive working environment." Since Title VII affords women and other
protected groups the right to work in an "environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule and insult," the existence of an "intimidating, hostile or
offensive working environment" for women, minorities and other protected
groups constitutes prohibited discrimination. See the discussion in Meritor Say.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986).
In the context of employment discrimination, the concept of "intimidating,
hostile or offensive working environment" has an analytically clear meaning. It
is a workplace environment that creates barriers to equal employment opportunity
by making it difficult for women or other protected groups to work in that
environment. There is no analytical or practical difficulty in establishing criteria
to determine whether such an environment in fact exists in a particular workplace:
Is the working environment such that a reasonable woman would have difficulty
working there because of the practices and behavior of employers, supervisors
or co-workers that are directed against women? Such practices and behavior must
be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment." Id at 67.
The business of the workplace is to produce goods, provide services, sell
products, and the like. Practices and behavior of employers, supervisors or coworkers that create an "intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment"
are usually irrelevant and counterproductive to the business of the workplace.
Elimination of such practices and behavior will not have an adverse effect on
the business of the workplace, but to the contrary, are likely to contribute to its
improvement. More significantly, for Title VII purposes, elimination of such
practices and behavior-and of the resulting "intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment-is absolutely necessary to provide equal employment opportunity for women and other protected groups.
The "fallacy of the transplanted concept," represented by the substitution
of "environment for educational pursuits" for "working environment" in the
University of Michigan's and other universities' "racist speech" policies, is that
the "business" of the university is education, not the production of goods and
services. Education involves the presentation and discussion of ideas, including
ideas that may be perceived as "intimidating, hostile, or offensive," such as
ideas about race, gender, sexual orientation, and the like. Thus, the concept of
"intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for educational pursuits" is
internally contradictory. The educational environment, by its very nature, may
be "intimidating, hostile, or offensive" to some students, or to many students,.
at one time or another because of the presentation and discussion of controversial
ideas. It is for this reason that the use of the concept of "intimidating, hostile
or offensive environment" to define prohibited activity in the context of a public
university's educational programs will necessarily result in constitutionally impermissible overbreadth and vagueness.
22. The "interpretive guide" was issued after concerns were expressed by

1991]

VIEW FROM WITHIN

1333

prohibit[ed] acts of expression or association that [were] absolutely
or in all but very limited circumstances protected by the first
amendment." The most important example, which was the basis
for the plaintiff's standing in Doe,24 and which was a major point
of reference for the overbreadth challenge, was the following: "A
male student makes remarks in class like 'Women just aren't as
good in this field as men,' thus creating a hostile learning atmosphere for female classmates.'' 2s The expression of this idea, of
course, would be contrary to the prevailing secular orthodoxy that
the tenets of feminism are superior to the traditional view of
women, and that there are no biological differences between the
sexes that would make members of one sex biologically more suited
to engage in particular kinds of activity than the other. Whenever
a male student expressed such an idea, he would be deemed to
have "created a hostile learning atmosphere for female class-

mates."
Another example, directed against the expression of offensive
ideas, was: "You comment in a derogatory way about a particular
person or group's physical appearance or sexual orientation, or
their cultural origins or religious beliefs." ' 26 The number of viewpoints and ideas that would be proscribed under this example is
staggering. 27 Still another example of this genre was: "You display
the Board of Regents about the vagueness of the terms in the policy. A copy of
the policy and the guide were sent by mail to all registered students at the
University for the 1988-89 academic year.
23. Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
16.
24. The plaintiff in Doe was a graduate psychology student whose field of
specialty was biopsychology, which he described as the interdisciplinary study of
the biological bases of individual differences in personality traits and mental
abilities. Using this example, he alleged that certain controversial theories positing
biologically-based differences between the sexes and among the races might be
perceived as "sexist" and "racist" by some students, and he feared that discussion
of such theories might subject him to sanction under the policy. 721 F. Supp. at
858. The district court found that Doe's fear of sanctions under the policy, if
such theories were discussed, was "entirely reasonable" and it was the "chilling
effect" on Doe's discussion of these theories that furnished the requisite "injury
in fact" for standing purposes. Id. at 859-61.
25. Id. at 858.
26. Id.
27. As the plaintiff in Doe stated in an affidavit: "Rather than encourage
her maturing students to question each other's beliefs on such diverse and
controversial issues such as the proper role of women in society, the merits of
particular religions, or the moral propriety of homosexuality, the University has
decided that it must protect its students from what it considers to be 'unenlightened ideas."' Affidavit of John Doe in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, at 8-9.
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a confederate flag on the door of your room in the residence
hall."' 2 The expression of ideas by the display of a flag has been
considered protected by the first amendment ever since Stromberg
v. California."
Finally, the policy, as administered in practice, clearly reached
the expression of ideas that were inconsistent with the officiallyapproved "secular orthodoxy." 0 The district court discussed three
cases involving a claimed violation resulting from expression occurring in the classroom to support its conclusion that, "as applied
by the University over the past year, the policy was consistently
applied to reach protected speech."'" In one of these cases a
graduate student in social work 32 was charged with harassment on

28. 721 F. Supp. at 858.
29. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
30. Through discovery, we obtained all of the cases in which complaints
of a violation of the policy were filed. As we had requested, all the names of
the complaining and offending students were deleted from the files. After sifting
through the cases, and discarding the large number of "obscene phone call"
complaints and most of the cases where no action was taken, we settled on
twenty representative cases and submitted them with a summary of each case
and the complete file as an Exhibit in Support in Plaintiff's Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction.
31. 721 F. Supp. at 865. This was in response to the university's argument
that the policy "did not apply to speech that was protected by the [f]irst
[a]mendment," and its urging the court to "disregard the Guide as 'inaccurate'
and look instead to the manner in which the [p]olicy has been interpreted and
applied by those charged with its enforcement." Id. at 864.
32. We later discovered that this student was black. Experience with the
operation of the policy indicated that contrary to the popular perception, "racist
speech" is not a matter of "straight white males versus minorities, women, gays,
and other victim groups." Here a complaint was filed against a black student
for "homophobic speech." In another case, a complaint was filed against a black
law student, who during the course of an argument with a white law student in
the law building, used the term "white trash," and said "[I]t would be in your
best interest not to be indignant with me or 4:00 will be more than quitting
time." The black student complied with the white student's demand for a letter
of apology. The letter of apology was very humiliating and could not help but
adversely affect the black law student's self-esteem-the very thing that a "racist
speech" policy is supposedly designed to protect. Still another case involved a
Chinese-American student, who in a discussion among male students, all apparently intoxicated, made a statement "asking why Black people feel discriminated
against," and also spoke about "conceited Jews." Following counseling, the
student apologized for his "inappropriate language" and his apology was accepted
by the other students. He said that he was attempting to complain that black
residents of the residence hall tended to socialize together and that as a ChineseAmerican, he felt isolated since he had no one with whom to associate. A number
of the complaints were filed by women students on the ground that male students,
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the basis of sexual orientation in that he had "repeatedly said that
homosexuality was an illness that needs to be cured," and that he
had "developed a model to change gay men and lesbians to a
heterosexual orientation." He had also discussed efforts to apply
this model in his field placement. The student contested the charge,
and the case went to a formal hearing, where a divided hearing
panel held that the student's discussion of "homosexuality as an
illness" did not violate the policy. The panel gratuitously stated,
however, that the finding should not be construed as "condoning
the actions or statements of the student," and that his statements
"should be reviewed by the appropriate social work professionals
' 33
in considering the student's suitability as a social worker.
In a second case, a student in a business school class read a
limerick which poked fun at the alleged homosexual acts of a wellknown athlete. After class, another student, apparently gay, read
him the policy and accused him of having engaged in "intimidating
behavior." The offending student immediately apologized, but the
offended student filed a complaint anyway. The offending student
agreed to an informal resolution, under which he was to publish
a letter of apology in the campus newspaper and to attend a "Gay
Rap" session. 34
The third case involved statements made by a white dental
student at the orientation session of a preclinical dentistry class.
The class was widely regarded as one of the most difficult for
second-year dentistry students. In the orientation session, when
the class was broken up into small groups, the student stated that,
"he had heard that minorities had a difficult time in the course
and that he heard they were not treated fairly." The faculty
member teaching the course, herself a minority person, filed a
complaint on the ground that the comment was unfair and hurt
her chances for tenure. The student was then "counseled" about
the existence of the policy, and he agreed to write a letter apologizing for making the statement without adequately verifying the
allegation, which he said he
had heard from his roommate, a black
35
former dentistry student.
sometimes unidentified, had put up posters or pictures of a sexual nature; one
such complaint was that magazine pictures of nude women were posted over the
stalls in the men's bathroom. Other complaints were on the basis of overheard
remarks that were not addressed to the complainant. In short, it was "everybody
complaining against everybody else about everything."
33. The case is discussed at 721 F. Supp. at 865.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 865-66.
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As the district court noted:
[t]he manner in which these three complaints were handled
demonstrated that the University considered serious comments made in the context of classroom discussion to be
sanctionable under the [p]olicy ....
There is no evidence
in the record that the Administrator ever declined to pursue
a complaint through attempted mediation because the alleged harassing conduct was protected by the first amendment ....
The University could not seriously argue that
the policy was never interpreted to reach protected conduct.
It is clear that the policy was overbroad both on its face
36
and as applied.

III. THE DOE

DECISION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERmssiBLITY OF
CAMPUs BANS ON "RACIST SPEECH"

I now want to elaborate further upon why a public university
cannot constitutionally prohibit the expression of "racist ideas"
on campus. This explanation will be related to the district court's
decision in Doe, and to the impact of the Doe decision on the
constitutional impermissibility of campus bans on "racist speech."
A public university cannot constitutionally prohibit the expression of "racist ideas" on campus, even on the assumption that
the expression of such ideas generally or in particular circumstances, creates an "intimidating, hostile or demeaning" environment for minority students and other "victim groups." It cannot
do so because, regardless of the justification, any prohibition on
the expression of "racist ideas" on the campus of a public university is inconsistent with three important first amendment principles. These principles are content neutrality, protection of offensive
speech, and heightened protection to expression in the academic
context.
Under the principle of content neutrality, the government may
not proscribe any expression because of its content, so that an
otherwise valid regulation violates the first amendment if it differentiates between expression based on its content. There are two
aspects to the principle of content neutrality: viewpoint neutrality
and category neutrality. Under the viewpoint neutrality aspect of
the principle, to which the Court has never recognized any excep-

36. Id. at 866.
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tions, the government cannot regulate expression in such a way as
to favor one viewpoint over another. 37 Under the category neutrality aspect of the principle, to which the Court has recognized
only limited exceptions, the government generally cannot regulate
in such a way as to differentiate between categories of expression.3"
A prohibition on the expression of "racist ideas" on campus
violates the viewpoint neutrality aspect of the content neutrality
principle. Such a prohibition favors a particular viewpoint over
the opposing viewpoint, such as the view of racial equality over
the view of racial inferiority, the view of gender equality over the
traditional view of male supremacy and female subordination, or
the view of homosexuality as being an acceptable lifestyle over the
view of homosexuality as being immoral or a condition of mental
illness. Under the principle of content neutrality, a public university

37. See generally the discussion of the viewpoint neutrality aspect of the
principle in Law of the FirstAmendment, supra note 6, at 10-12. The requirement
of viewpoint neutrality was the basis for the Court's invalidation of state and
federal bans on flag desecration in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 399 (1989) and
United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). The difference between the
majority and the dissent in both of these cases was whether the requirement of
viewpoint neutrality was implicated by these bans. The majority took the position
that the asserted governmental interest in preserving the flag as a "symbol of
nationhood and national unity" did implicate this requirement. They emphasized
that the government authorized burning as a proper means of disposing of a
torn or soiled flag, so that the thrust of the ban was directed toward the "content
of the message" conveyed by the burning. 491 U.S. at 410-12; 110 S. Ct. at
2409.
Other cases involving the requirement of viewpoint neutrality include: Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (prohibition of display of sign within 500 feet of
foreign embassy that "would tend to bring the foreign government into public
odium or public disrepute"); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (federal
law allowing wearing of U.S. military uniforms in portrayal only if the portrayal
does not "tend to discredit the military"); American Booksellers Ass'n. v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd., 475 U.S. 1001, reh'g denied, 475
U.S. 1132 (1986) (law defining "pornography" in such a way as to mandate an
officially-approved view of "equality" between men and women in sexual encounters).
38. See generally the discussion of the category aspect of the principle of
content neutrality in Law of the First Amendment, supra note 6, at 12-14. The
Court has recognized only two limited exceptions to this aspect of the principle,
one involving special zoning regulation of businesses that purvey sexually explicit
materials, and one involving regulation of commercial billboards. In addition,
regarding access to public property that is not a traditional or designated public
forum, since the government may reserve the property for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, it may impose category-type regulations appropriate
to the particular property.
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cannot favor one viewpoint over another for any reason, including
the reason that the expression of the officially disapproved' 39viewpoint causes discrete educational harm to "victim groups.
Under the principle of protection of offensive speech, the
government cannot prohibit the expression of an idea on the
ground that the idea itself is highly offensive to many people. As
the Supreme Court stated in Texas v. Johnson: "If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
4
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.'"'
In that case, the Court refused to recognize an exception to this
principle "even where our flag has been involved. ' 41 Nor may the
government prohibit the expression of an idea in a particular
manner that is highly offensive, such as by the use of an "unseemly
expletive.''42

Thus, any time the government tries to justify a restriction of
expression on the ground of the "offensiveness" of the particular
expression, the justification is necessarily improper. This means
that a public university cannot constitutionally justify a ban on
"racist speech" on the ground that it expresses a highly offensive
idea or that it is very offensive to the "victim groups." It is
likewise immaterial that the "racist speech" is considered to cause
direct educational harm to members of "victim groups." The harm
is caused only because the idea itself or the manner in which it is

39. In Doe, we illustrated this proposition by the "women just aren't as
good in this field as men" example:
As the plaintiff has demonstrated in his Affidavit, under the hp]olicy
the University has established a 'secular orthodoxy,' an element of

which, as illustrated by the above example, is that 'the tenets of feminism
are superior to the traditional view of women.' Under the principle of

content neutrality, the government may not 'ordain a preferred viewpoint
about women' .. . . Nor may it prescribe the expression of any idea
because of the content of that idea or the message it conveys, in the

name of creating a 'non-hostile' environment for students.
Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 12-13.
40. 491 U.S. at 414.
41. Id. The principle of protection to offensive speech also applies to
commercial speech, therefore, the government cannot prohibit product advertising,
such as an advertisement for contraceptives, on the ground that such advertising
would be offensive to many persons. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,
463 U.S. 60 (1983).
42. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971)

(public display of jacket with the message, "Fuck the draft").
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'43
expressed is offensive to the members of the "victim groups.
Therefore, the protection of offensive speech principle applies and
is dispositive. 44
The principle of heightened protection to expression in the
academic context emerged from constitutional challenges to governmental efforts in the '50s and '60s to impose a political orthodoxy on university campuses and in the public schools. In a number
of cases the Court invalidated legislative inquiries into the beliefs
and associations of teachers and loyalty oath requirements for
public employees by emphasizing the importance of free inquiry
in the academic context, stating that the first amendment "does
not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."' 4- This principle was also involved in cases arising in the
late '60s and early '70s when public universities tried to sanction
or restrict "anti-establishment" student speech and association on
campus. The Court held, for example, that a public university
could not refuse to grant official recognition to a student group
because of a disagreement with the group's philosophy or because
of an unsubstantiated fear that the group would be a "disruptive
influence," 46 or discipline a student for distributing on campus a
newspaper containing material that was inconsistent with the univ-

43. The relationship between the purported offensiveness of "racist speech"
and the resulting harm to members of "victim groups" was an underlying premise
of the University of Michigan's policy invalidated in Doe. The rationale for the
policy, according to then acting President Fleming was that, "students at a
university cannot by speaking or writing discriminatory remarks which seriously
offend many individuals beyond the immediate victim, and which, therefore
detract from the necessary educational climate of a campus, claim immunity from
a campus disciplinary proceeding." 721 F. Supp. at 855.
44. As we stated in our brief, again using the "women just aren't as good
in this field as men" example:
It may well be that female students at the University of Michigan would
be offended by the expression of the idea that, 'women just aren't as
good in this field as men,' or that, 'women are more suited than men
to care for children,' and would find the expression of such ideas to
create a 'hostile learning atmosphere' .

...

...[Tihe University may not prohibit the expression of any idea, no
matter how offensive the idea or the form in which it is expressed may
be to other students. Nor may the University say that a particular idea
is so offensive as to create an 'intimidating, hostile or demeaning
environment for educational pursuits.'
Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 13-14
(emphasis in original).
45. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
46. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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ersity's view of "conventions of decency." 47 The principle of
heightened protection to expression in the academic context oper-

ates to preclude a public university from prohibiting the expression
of "racist ideas," notwithstanding the purported harm that the
expression of these ideas causes to "victim groups. "48

In its opinion in Doe, the district court discussed the interaction
of the principles of content neutrality, protection of offensive
speech, and heightened protection to expression in the academic

context, as they related to the facial invalidity of the university's
"racist speech" policy:

What the University could not do, however, was establish
an anti-discrimination policy which had the effect of pro-

hibiting certain speech because it disagreed with the ideas
or messages sought to be conveyed ....
Nor could the
University proscribe speech simply because it was found to
be offensive, even gravely so, by large numbers of -peo-

ple .... These principles acquire a special significance in
the university setting, where the free and unfettered interplay of competing views is essential to the institution's

educational mission.49

The court concluded that the policy was void on its face for

overbreadth because, by its terms, it reached "broad categories of
speech, a substantial amount of which is constitutionally protected. "50
47. Papish v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, reh'g
denied, 411 U.S. 960 (1973). During this time, lower courts invalidated the efforts
of public universities to ban "controversial" speakers on campus, making it clear
that a public university's policy on outside speakers generally must be limited to
imposing reasonable and content-neutral time, place and manner regulations. See,
e.g., Pickings v. Bruce, 430 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1970); Molpus v. Fortune, 432
F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1970); Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963 (N.D.Miss. 1969)
(three-judge).
48. As we argued in our brief:
The third fundamental [f]irst [a]mendment principle that is literally
trashed by the University's [p]olicy is the principle of heightened protection of expression in the academic context ...
[..
The University, in the name of creating a 'non-hostile environment for students,' has established a 'secular orthodoxy.' The [f]irst
[a]mendment, however, precludes the University from casting a 'pall of
[secular] orthodoxy over the classroom.
Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 14-15.
49. 721 F. Supp. at 863.
50. Id.
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The point to be emphasized is that the university's policy was
void on its face, not because it was poorly drafted, but rather
because it reached categories of speech that were constitutionally
protected. The underlying premises of the policy made it clear that
the policy was intended to reach these protected categories of
speech, since the policy was directed at the expression of "racist
ideas" that were deemed to cause discrete educational harm to
racial minorities and other "victim groups."
It will be recalled that proponents of bans on "racist speech"
justify these bans as being necessary to advance the equality value
of the fourteenth amendment and to provide equal educational
opportunity for members of "victim groups." ' 5' This was exactly
the justification that the52University of Michigan advanced for its
"racist speech" policy. But as demonstrated, the policy was
directed at the expression of "racist ideas," and the premise of
the policy was that the expression of those ideas caused discrete
educational harm to members of "victim groups." The University
of Michigan then tried to do the very thing that proponents of
bans on "racist speech" say that a university should do: Restrict
"racist speech" in order to provide equal educational opportunity
for members of "victim groups."
What Doe makes clear, however, is that a public university is
constitutionally foreclosed from trying to bring about equal educational opportunity in this way. A prohibition of "racist speech,"
no matter how narrowly-framed and no matter how justified, is
necessarily directed against the expression of "racist" ideas. This
being so, the underlying basis of a "racist speech" policy is
inconsistent with the first amendment principles of content neutrality, protection of offensive speech, and heightened protection
to freedom of expression in the academic context. In light of these
principles, a public university cannot establish an officially approved "secular orthodoxy" and cannot protect minority students
and other members of "victim groups" from exposure to "racist
ideas," no matter how offensive these ideas may be and no matter
how much discrete "educational harm" these ideas cause to members of "victim groups."' 53

51. See supra note 2.
52. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.

53. In this connection, it is completely irrelevant from a constitutional
standpoint that "racist speech" is purportedly inconsistent with the equality value

of the fourteenth amendment. As a constitutional matter, "racist speech" does
not involve any "tension" between the fourteenth amendment's equality guarantee
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The reason Doe is so important in practice is that it demonstrates several key points. First, a prohibition against "racist
speech" on campus is directed against the expression of "racist
ideas." Second, the expression of "racist ideas" on the campus
of a public university is fully protected under the first amendment
principles of content neutrality, the protection of offensive speech,
and heightened protection to expression in the academic context.
Third, because of this protection, a ban on "racist speech" on
campus cannot constitutionally be justified on the ground that it
causes direct educational harm to members of "victim groups."
Academic commentators who dismiss Doe as a case about poorlydrafted "racist speech" restrictions are simply ignoring the district
court's careful analysis and application of first amendment principles in reaching its conclusion that the University of Michigan's
"racist speech" policy was void on its face. A careful reading of
the Doe decision, with reference to its rationale and the district
court's analysis and application of first amendment principles,
should make it clear that virtually any campus ban on "racist
speech" imposed by a public university will be found to violate
the first amendment. While academic commentators may continue
to discount the impact of Doe and go about the business of
advocating significant bans on "racist speech" on campus, lawyers
for a public university considering the imposition of such a ban
54
are likely to treat the Doe decision with considerably more respect.

and the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression. The fourteenth
amendment prohibits the state from engaging in invidious racial discrimination;
the first amendment prohibits the state from abridging freedom of expression.
These guarantees do not "conflict" in the sense that one cannot be asserted to
obviate what would otherwise be a violation of the other. For example, the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause prohibits the states from operating racially-segregated public schools, and the states cannot get out from under
the fourteenth amendment and justify state-imposed segregation in the public
schools on the ground that whites should have a "freedom of association" right
not to associate with blacks in public facilities. See the discussion of this point
in Sedler, The Constitution and School Degregation:An Inquiry into the Nature
of the Substantive Right, 68 Ky. L.J. 879, 939-40 (1979-80). By the same token,
the first amendment principles of content neutrality, protection of offensive
speech, and heightened protection to freedom of expression in the academic
context prohibit a public university from restricting the expression of "racist
speech" on campus. The public university cannot get out from under the first
amendment and justify the restriction on the ground that it is necessary to provide
equal educational opportunity for racial minorities and other members of "victim
groups."
54. In practice, the Doe decision has had at least some impact within this
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THE MATTER OF "NARRow" BANs ON "RAcisT SPEECH"

Some academic commentators maintain that certain types of
restrictions on "racist speech," not directed primarily at the expression of "racist ideas," but rather at "racial epithets," "direct
face-to-face racial insults," and "targeted vilification" are constitutionally permissible. Professor Charles Lawrence, in a far-ranging
analysis of "racist speech," has argued that the first amendment
permits "narrowly drafted provisions aimed at racist speech that
results in direct, immediate, and substantial injury. 5 5. These would
include both "face-to-face"' racial insults and "racial epithets and
vilification that do not involve face-to-face encounters-situations
in which the victim is a captive audience and the injury is exThe bringing of the "lawyers' perspective" to the matter of campus bans
on "racist speech" is illustrated by the article in this symposium by Ms. Patricia
Hodulik, who is Senior System Legal Counsel for the Office of General Counsel
of the University of Wisconsin System, and who was the principal drafter of the
System's "racist speech" policy. Hodulik, Racist Speech on Campus 37 WAYNE
L. Rnv. 1433 (1991). Ms. Hodulik notes that "compliance with the first amendment became the focus of the regulatory effort," and contends that "what
emerged was a narrow rule based principally on the first amendment 'fighting
words' doctrine, and incorporating equal opportunity concepts that prohibit
demeaning expressive behavior that creates a hostile environment for minorities."
Id. at 1437. The Wisconsin policy applies only to intentional "racist" remarks
directed at a particular person and specifically excludes statements made during
class discussion. Id. at 1438-39. Ms. Hodulik emphasizes that the policy represents
a careful effort to satisfy the requirements of the first amendment. However, I
think that it still has overbreadth and vagueness problems, due to the use of the
"intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment" concept, see supra note 21,
and due to the fact that, whether intended or not, it still reaches the expression
of "racist ideas," albeit on a one-to-one basis.
Ms. Hodulik's article also makes a very valuable contribution to the discussion of campus bans on "racist speech" because it is built around a specific
proposal. Professor Brownstein's article in the Symposium, Brownstein, Hate
Speech at Public Universities: The Searchfor an Enforcement Model, 37 WAYNE
L. REv. 1451 (1991) is also helpful in this regard, because it discusses the
University of California at Davis' policy. Much academic commentary in this
area avoids setting out specific proposals that incorporate the author's views of
permissible restrictions on "racist speech." By avoiding specific proposals, the
authors also avoid subjecting their views to careful first amendment analysis. It
is only when a specific proposal is presented that it is possible to engage in
reasoned debate as to what kinds of restrictions are permissible under the "law
of the first amendment," and as to whether the "law of the first amendment"
should be modified to permit restrictions on "racist speech," and if so, in what
respects it should be modified. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
On October 11, 1991, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin held that the University of Wisconsin policy was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of
the Univ. of Wis. Sys., No. 90-C-328 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 11, 1991).
55. Lawrence, supra note 2 at 437.
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perienced by all members of a racial group who are forced to hear
or see these words; the insulting words, in effect, are aimed at the
56
entire group.1
I have discussed the constitutional issues raised by Professor
Lawrence's proposals at length elsewhere. I would submit, however, that most of Professor Lawrence's proposals would be unconstitutional if adopted by a public university. No matter how
the proposals areframed or justified, they are still directed against
the expression of "racist ideas," and as Doe makes clear, the
expression of "racist ideas" on the campus of a public university
is fully protected by the first amendment.
Professor Lawrence argues that face-to face racial insults are
the "functional equivalent" of fighting words, and are undeserving
of first amendment protection, because (1) they create an immediate injurious impact on the victim and leave no opportunity for
response speech, and (2) they disserve the purpose of the first
amendment, "because the perpetrator's intention is not to discover
truth or initiate dialogue but to injure the victim. 5 7 "Fighting
words" are not protected by the first amendment because they are
an invitation to a fight, and so amount to an illegal "verbal act"
rather than the expression of an idea for first amendment purposes.58 The expression of "racist ideas" on a one-to-one basis,
however, even if considered the "functional equivalent" of "fighting words," is still the expression of an idea for purposes of the
first amendment. It is thus constitutionally protected, notwithstanding that the "racist" idea is intended to "stigmatize" the person
to whom it is addressed. Nor does it matter that the intention is
to "injure the victim," because that "injury" results solely from
the expression of an idea. Again, under the principle of protection
of offensive speech, the expression of a "racist" idea is protected
no matter how offensive it is, no matter what the purpose of the
speaker in expressing it, and no matter what kind of harm it
causes to the person to whom it is addressed. 9

56. Id.
57. Id. at 452.
58. See the discussion of "fighting words" in Strossen, supra note 2, at
226-27; L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 929 n.9 (2d ed. 1988). In

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989), the Supreme Court referred to that
"small class of 'fighting words' that are 'likely to provoke the average person
to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace."'
59. Professor Lawrence uses Stanford University's definition of "harassment by vilification" as a model of permissible regulation of "face-to-face"
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Professor Lawrence contends that minority students and other
members of "victim groups" are a "captive audience" on the
university campus and so, while on campus, are entitled to be
protected against "racial vilification." He essentially invokes the
"privacy of the home" justification for this proposal. However,
he extends the "privacy of the home" concept to include not only
a student's dormitory room but common living spaces and in fact
the entire campis.6° "Racial vilification" directed at a "captive
audience" is no less protected than the expression of other ideas
directed at an audience that cannot escape the message being
conveyed by the speaker.
It is certainly true that under the doctrine of reasonable time,
place and manner regulation, 6' the government may constitutionally
impose regulations that enable an unwilling listener to avoid speech
in the privacy of the listener's home.6 2 There would be no constitutional problem, therefore, with a public university's regulation
that enabled a student to exclude "unwanted speech," racist or
otherwise, from her or his dormitory room. Such a regulation
could authorize a student to put up a notice saying, "post nothing
on the door to my room and put nothing under the door." This
would be a fully constitutional, content-neutral place regulation,
designed to protect the student from "unwanted speech" in the
privacy of the student's dormitory room.
Common rooms and the entire university campus, however,
do not constitute a student's home. A ban on "racial vilification"
throughcut the campus could not conceivably be sustained as a
reasonable time, place and manner regulation designed to protect

racial insults. It states that "speech or other expression intended to insult or
stigmatize an individual or a small number of individuals on the basis of race,
etc., and (1) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults
or stigmatizes and (2) makes use of 'fighting words' or non-verbal symbols."
Lawrence, supra note 2, at 450-51. There is no doubt that such a "harassment
by vilification" rule, if adopted by a public university, would be void on its face
for overbreadth because, by its terms, it deliberately goes beyond unprotected
"fighting words" and essentially prohibits the expression of "racist ideas" on a
one-to-one basis.
60. Lawrence, supra note 2, at 456-57.
61. See the discussion of this doctrine in Law of the First Amendment,

supra note 6, at 20-25.

62. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (ordinance prohibiting

"focused picketing" directed against a person in front of a person's home);
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (federal law

enabling an unwilling recipient of advertisements for sexually explicit material to
prevent them from coming into the home).
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the privacy of the "student's home." Professor Lawrence is saying
that minority students and members of other "victim groups"
should have the right not to be exposed to "racist ideas" while
on a university campus because they are a "captive audience"
there. But as we have emphasized, and as Doe makes clear, a
public university cannot constitutionally protect minority students
from exposure to "racist ideas." This is no less true when the
students are in "common rooms" or going across the campus than
it is when they are in the classroom. Any effort to do so runs up
against the first amendment principles of content neutrality, the
protection of offensive speech, and heightened protection to expression in the academic context, and is clearly unconstitutional.
As this discussion of Professor Lawrence's proposals demonstrates, so-called "narrowly drafted provisions aimed at .racist
speech that results in direct, immediate and substantial injury" are
still directed at the expression of "racist ideas." Thus, they have
the same objective as the University of Michigan's "racist speech"
policy that was held unconstitutional in Doe, and they would be
held unconstitutional for the same reasons. Again, a public university cannot constitutionally prohibit the expression of "racist
ideas," no matter how it tries to justify that prohibition, and no
matter how "narrowly-framed" the prohibition purportedly is.
A different kind of first amendment analysis would apply
where a public university merely prohibited the use of "racial
epithets." The university could try to justify the restriction as a
reasonable time, place and manner limitation assuming that the
university succeeds in defining the proscribed "racial epithets"
with sufficient precision to withstand a vagueness or overbreadth
challenge' 3-which, in my opinion, it could only do by specifically

63. Mr. Henry Saad, who represented the University of Michigan in Doe,
has prepared an article for this Symposium in which he contends that prohibitions
on the use of racial epithets in the classroom do not violate the first amendment,
a proposition with which I agree. Saad, The Case for Prohibitions of Racial
Epithets in the University Classroom, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 1351 (1991). While
noting that the prohibition must be drafted "narrowly and carefully," Mr. Saad
indicates his view that the use of the term, "racial epithets and slurs," is
sufficiently clear to survive a facial challenge, as long as it is accompanied by a
specific intent to "demean the victim" and "unreasonably and substantially
interferes with the victim's ability to obtain an education," and a disclaimer of
applicability to the expression of ideas, "including racist or sexist ideology or
philosophy." The limited rule would certainly not give rise to any overbreadth
or vagueness problems, but it would be better if the rule specifically indicated
the prohibited "racial epithets" and kindred words.
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proscribing particular "racial epithets" and kindred words. 64 It
would argue that such a restriction is appropriate on a university
campus in order to "promote civilized discourse" and to prevent
the "discrete injury" racial minorities and other "victim groups"
suffer from "racial epithets." Moreover, there is certainly no need
for any person to express any idea by the use of "racial epithets."
In order to be plausibly sustained as a reasonable time, place and
manner restriction, such a restriction could not be directed against
the expression of "racist ideas," but only against the means by
which those ideas would be expressed on a university campus.
Under such a restriction, for example, a student could put up a
poster saying, "Blacks are intellectually and morally inferior and
don't belong at the university," but not a poster substituting the
"racial epithet," "niggers," for "blacks."
Professor Lawrence and other proponents of bans on "racist
speech," while making use of "racial epithets" to illustrate "racially assaultive speech," have never proposed a ban limited only
to the use of "racial epithets." In all fairness, such an extremely
limited ban would not accomplish their objective of protecting
minority students from the harm that they contend results from
"racist speech." The perceived harm would only be marginally
less, if at all, when the message is "blacks are inferior," than it
would be when the message is "niggers are inferior."
Nonetheless, for our present purposes, it is sufficient to note
that a ban on the use of "racial epithets" imposed by a public
university could plausibly be sustained against a first amendment
challenge justified as constituting a reasonable time, place and
manner limitation. 65 In my opinion, it could be sustained on this
basis as applied to the one place on a university campus where
"racial epithets" are not likely to be used at all, the classroom. 66
It is difficult to perceive even the most "racist" professor or
student using "racial epithets" in the classroom today. 6 But in
the completely hypothetical situation where a professor would do
64. See the discussion of the doctrine of reasonable time, place and manner
regulation in Law of the FirstAmendment, supra note 6, at 20-25.
65. More specifically, as a place and manner limitation.
66. Mr. Saad's article, supra note 63, sets forth a number of reasons why
a ban on the use of "racial epithets" in the classroom is consistent with first
amendment doctrine and principles. Without disagreeing with his analysis, I
would say that the reasons he gives also support the conclusion that such a ban
constitutes a reasonable time, place and manner limitation.
67. For example, discussing the meaning of the word "nigger" in American
society today would, of course, be related to legitimate academic purposes.
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so, it is an impermissible act of discrimination directed against
minority students because it serves no purpose other than to make
them feel inferior and unwanted in the classroom. Likewise, if a
student would try to use "racial epithets" in class, the professor
would doubtless prohibit the student from using such language in
the discourse of the classroom.6
Outside of the confines of the classroom, however, a ban on
the use of "racial epithets" becomes more difficult to sustain as
a reasonable time, place and manner limitation. 69 The matter of
maintaining an "appropriate level of discourse" becomes quite
diffuse when applied to the university campus as a whole. This is
particularly true if the university has made no other effort to
prescribe an "appropriate level of discourse" except for the ban
on "racial epithets." Moreover, the ban on the use of "racial
epithets" is premised on the offensiveness of this expression,
thereby implicating the first amendment principle of protection of
offensive speech. For these reasons, it is highly problematical that
a ban on the use of "racial epithets," going beyond the classroom
and applied to the campus as a whole, could be sustained as a
reasonable time, place, and manner regulation.
In any event, it must be emphasized that most proposed campus
bans on "racist speech" are not limited to "racial epithets," and
the proponents do not try to justify these bans as being nothing
more than a reasonable time, place and manner regulation. The
proposed bans are directed against the expression of "racist ideas,"
and no matter how narrowly-framed or justified, they cannot be
sustained under the "law of the first amendment."
V.

CONCLUSION

This discussion demonstrates why Doe v. University of Michigan is an important case in practice. It was not a case about
poorly-drafted bans on "racist speech," but a case about fundamental first amendment principles. The holding in Doe and the
opinion of the district court in that case make it clear that virtually
68. The professor's right to maintain a suitable level of discourse in the
classroom would give the professor the right to prohibit the use of any "unseemly
expletives" in the classroom that otherwise would be permissible on the streets
or in a public building. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, reh'g denied, 404

U.S. 876 (1971).

69. "Racial epithets" addressed to a person on a one-to-one basis could
be proscribed if they amount to "fighting words," or if they are a part of a
course of conduct amounting to the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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any ban of "racist speech" on campus imposed by a public
university will be found to violate the first amendment. While the
academic debate about the protection of "racist speech" under
the first amendment will continue-as it should-Doe teaches us
that under the "law of the first amendment," there cannot be
"racist speech" bans on the campuses of public universities. Doe
is thus one of the most important first amendment cases decided
by a lower federal court in recent times, and in the "real world"
70
of constitutional litigation, it will have a tremendous impact.

70. It is likely to have the same impact on campus bans on "racist speech"
at public universities that the Seventh Circuit decision in American Booksellers
Ass'n. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd., 475 U.S. 1001, reh'g
denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986), has had on so-called "civil rights anti-pornography"
laws. While the academic debate may continue over whether the first amendment
should protect the "graphic sexually explicit subordination of women," it is clear
after Hudnut, that laws proscribing expression on this basis violate the first
amendment, therefore, such laws are no longer being proposed or enacted.

